Naval War College Review
Volume 69
Number 2 Spring

Article 15

2016

Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors
and U.S. Foreign Policy
Bruce E. Stanley
Neal H. Bralley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Stanley, Bruce E. and Bralley, Neal H. (2016) "Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy," Naval War
College Review: Vol. 69 : No. 2 , Article 15.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/15

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Stanley and Bralley: Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Forei

The construal level theory consists of
several key components. The more distant our goals, the greater we construe
the long time horizon abstractly. The
more immediate our goals, the greater
we construe the short-term horizon in
detail. Consequently, the desirability
of distant goals can overshadow their
feasibility. National leaders who formulate lofty goals for the distant future
support transformative objectives, while
those who focus on the particulars of
combat operations tend to be preoccupied with a maintenance outlook
that is far more cautious about future
estimations. Proponents of desirability
and transformative strategies for peace
display deductive reasoning based on
preexisting concepts, whereas advocates
of feasibility and maintenance approaches demonstrate inductive thinking
sensitive to context-specific information. Undergirding these processes in
strategic assessments, the construal
level theory presupposes the dynamic
of communication fluency. In other
words, civilian and military leaders’
predispositions toward either desirability or feasibility will determine the
flow of information and whether the
incoming data are accepted or rejected.
Rapport suggests that the semantics of
“postwar” be reformulated. The semantics of “post” makes reconstruction endeavors more of an afterthought, and the
“post” verbiage buys into a sequential
scheme of arranging operations instead
of a fluid model of cooperative interaction. From this descriptive analysis, he
offers a prescriptive remedy to the problem: instead of sequencing or paralleling
phases of the total operation, he suggests
overlapping the coordination of waging
war and planning peace so as to harmonize stabilization considerations with
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kinetic aims. To that end, greater joint
agency collaboration between military
and civilian leaders—both desirability
visionaries and feasibility organizers—
must take place for abstract ends
and concrete means to synergize in
the range of military operations. By
bringing the why of desirability and
the how of feasibility together through
interagency cooperation, U.S. presidents and their senior advisers will be
better equipped to win the peace, and
not simply the war, through a continuum of joint operational planning.
Overall, Rapport’s use of construal
level theory for understanding the gap
between jus in bello and jus post bellum
is persuasive. Readers must decide
whether this particular theory assumes
too great a role in explaining the lack
of correlation between war fighting
and state building and, in the process,
minimizes the cultural, political, and
economic factors that frame the context
and motivate the power brokers of a
given historical period. For scholars and
students, policy makers, and warfighters, Rapport’s interdisciplinary work
in history, international policy, and
psychology is a fascinating study worth
the time and money to read and heed.
EDWARD ERWIN

Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Bruce E. Stanley.
Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac Books, 2015. 238 pages.
$25 (paperback).

Bruce Stanley, a retired Army officer and
professor at the United States Army’s
School of Advanced Military Studies, has
written a detailed and well-documented
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volume on the recent use of private
military contractors by the United States
Department of Defense and their utility.
He has done this by taking a scholarly,
microeconomic approach to assessing
how and under what conditions the
military has most recently employed
private military contractors within the
context of overall U.S. foreign policy.
While Stanley begins with a clear, easily
understandable introductory discussion of what private military contractors
are, how they differ from mercenaries,
and why they are valuable to the U.S.
military today, he later delves into the
microeconomic model’s concept of supply and demand as it relates to private
military contractors within theaters of
operation. He provides all the economic,
mathematical, and statistical modeling
and analysis that a postgraduate student
might desire. However, readers who
have a “diminishing marginal utility”
for the nuances of academic economics
may safely bypass the in-depth mathematical discussions and proceed to his
qualitative discussion of this subject.
Stanley’s book looks at four recent U.S.
military engagements, each of which
saw the use of private military contractors: DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM (1990–91), Bosnia (1995), U.S.
operations in Afghanistan (2001 to very
nearly the present), and U.S. operations
throughout the Iraq war (2003–12).
He examines the similarities between
these engagements, the existing demand for the contractors’ services, and
how the various contracted providers were able to supply those services
for the Department of Defense.
Stanley maintains a balance in his examination of the use of contractors in the
performance of our military’s mission.
He does not delve into the oft-heard
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complaints from many in uniform that
contractors are solely in the business
to make money. Frankly, all business
entrepreneurs are in business to make
a profit; it is a crucial part of the very
fabric of America. Profit is the entrepreneur’s reward for assuming risk within
the marketplace. Indeed, the protection
of capitalism is among the fundamental
reasons our armed forces exist. This suggests a tolerant view of those engaged in
business in general; and private military
contractors in particular share substantial risk to life and limb to support our
armed forces. Since the end of the Cold
War, the Department of Defense has
successively and significantly reduced
the numbers of active-duty personnel.
While the numbers of soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and Marines have fallen, the
mission requirements of our armed
services have not diminished. As a
result, in an effort to use our uniformed
service members in the business of
actual combat tasks, the Department
of Defense and its subordinate military
departments and combatant commands
have resorted to using contractors to
provide the many logistical and other
supporting service tasks necessary to
support their combat operations.
Stanley’s study includes the sobering
numbers of civilian military contractors
wounded and killed in these various theaters. Over certain periods, the casualty
numbers experienced by some private
military contractors closely mirrored
those experienced by soldiers. His book
provides a deeper understanding of the
very real risks these companies and their
employees have faced in the support
of our deployed service members.
The United States has successfully
conducted recent and current military
operations to support our foreign policy.
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Readers should note that doing so
requires us to maintain both a sufficient
number of uniformed armed forces
personnel and a treasury sufficient to
fund both military operations involving
soldiers conducting extended combat
operations anywhere in the world and
the significant expense of hiring private
military contractors to perform the support services necessary to enable them.
This economic model, while currently
feasible and tenable for the United States
as a wealthy nation, may not work for
another nation with more-constrained
resources. In the future, while the
“demand” may be there and the “supply” of contractors may still exist, if
a nation does not have the financial
resources to pay for those contracted
services, this model might not work.
Outsourcing Security is a valuable
read for military and civilian defense professionals. Stanley applies
a thoughtful analysis to what many
may have thought they understood,
and his work brings both depth
and academic merit to the topic.
NEAL H. BRALLEY

Success and Failure in Limited War: Information
& Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf
& Iraq Wars, by Spencer D. Bakich. Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 2014. 344 pages. $35
(paperback).

This groundbreaking treatise by Dr.
Spencer Bakich, visiting lecturer in
political science at the University
of Richmond, endeavors to explain
America’s mixed success with limited
war since 1950 by way of a new theoretical approach to analyzing policystrategy formulation and execution at
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the highest levels of government. For the
purposes of his theory, Bakich characterizes limited wars as those fought
at a high level of intensity for limited
aims but whose outcomes “are of a
considerable consequence for the states
involved and for the broader international system.” Furthermore, restraint
is necessary to avoid escalation—a
tendency of limited wars. Not surprisingly, Bakich focuses his analysis on
four preeminent case studies from the
“American century”: the Korean War;
the Vietnam War; the Persian Gulf War
(Operation DESERT STORM); and the
Iraq war (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM).
The book’s first two chapters are largely
theoretical. Bakich points out how established approaches such as “rationalistic
strategic choice theory” and the “foreign
policy decision making (FPDM) school”
cannot fully explain how information
influences strategy, or its outcome,
in war. He argues that organizational
theory does not capture the true nature
of relationships between strategic
leaders and national security organizations. As Bakich writes, “A gap remains
in our understanding of the sources
of strategic success in [limited] war.”
To bridge this gap, Bakich confidently
posits his “information institutions”
approach. Simply put, it is the pattern
of information flow between those at
the apex of power and their national
security organizations that predisposes
states to success or failure in limited war.
The information institutions approach
suggests that top decision makers served
by an information-rich and densely
networked national security apparatus should have a better grasp of the
strategic environment and experience
greater military-diplomatic coordination
in planning and execution, significantly
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